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From Blind Obedience to Informed Consent.
Financial and Administrative Knowledge as a Political Tool in some
French Provincial Estates during the Ancien Régime, 1751-1789
Jérôme LOISEAU*
Abstract. The quest for ýnancial transparency in the last decade of the Ancien Régime
in France generated developments in the science of administration, particularly in
public accountancy. These changes were not conýned to the national level. Increasing
ýscal pressure from the monarchy prompted the provincial estates to produce their own
administrative knowledge, especially in ýscal and ýnancial matters, which would serve
to improve policies for the public good. In this manner, the estates meant to bring about
a shift from blind obedience to the king’s demands to informed consent, which had been
denied them since the reign of Louis XIV.
Keywords. Provincial estates, Financial transparency, Administrative science,
Obedience, Taxes
Résumé. De l’obéissance aveugle au consentement éclairé. Le savoir þnancier et
administratif comme instrument politique dans quelques états provinciaux de
la France d’Ancien Régime, 1751-1789. La dernière décennie de l’Ancien Régime
en France est marquée par l’émergence de la nécessité d’une transparence ýnancière
entrainant une évolution de la science administrative, et notamment de la comptabilité
publique. Ces changements se produisirent aussi à l’échelle des États provinciaux.
La pression ýscale les poussa à produire une science administrative fondée sur un
inventaire notamment de leurs caractéristiques ýscales et ýnancières aýn de soutenir
des politiques d’amélioration du bien public. Ainsi les états entendaient passer de
l’obéissance aveugle au monarque à un consentement éclairé, ce qui leur était interdit
depuis Louis XIV.
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In 1751, the Roman printer Laurent Carabioni published the ýrst opus
of Victor Riqueti, marquis de Mirabeau, entitled Mémoire concernant
l’utilité des États provinciaux. With this text the young deputy to the French
court of the Assemblée des Communautés et des Procureurs du pays et
comté de Provence staked out his position in the political debates that arose
in France in the wake of War of the Austrian Succession.1 Indeed, on the
19th of May 1749, in order to deal with the mountain of debts incurred
by the French involvement in this conþict, Jean-Baptiste de Machault
d’Arnouville, contrôleur général des Finances, established a new direct
tax, the Vingtième (or twentieth), a 5% ýxed rate tax on all types of income
in the kingdom, regardless of social status. This project encountered much
opposition, in particular from the clergy and provincial estates. Opposition
from the powerful États de Languedoc was particularly notable and earned
them a suspension of their activities from February 1750 to October 1752, a
punishment which they had not experienced since 1629.
In the eighteenth century considerable criticism was directed
against the privileges of the provinces ruled by provincial assemblies of
the three estates, especially their privilege of consenting to ýscal levies.2
Montesquieu, for example, emphasized the fact that these provinces did
not pay their fair share of taxes to the Royal Treasury in contrast to the
so-called pays d’élections, provinces which the government in Versailles
administered directly by means of royal commissioners (intendants).3 It
was in response to this current of criticism that Mirabeau chose to write in
defence of provincial estates and developed a triple argument highlighting
that the estates were the supports of royal authority, that their ýnancial credit
could be a resource for the monarchy and that their model of administration
promoted the happiness of the people they administered. Mirabeau thus
openly challenged the principle of the secrecy of state affairs which forbade
public discussion of political matters, including ýnancial ones, a notion
inherited from Jean Bodin and Richelieu.4 Mirabeau joined the political
movement in favour of doing away with the state’s secrecy, a position
which was defended by others in the following decade, for example the
1. F.-X. EMMANUELLI, 1978; R. BLAUFARB, 2012. In 1630, this institution replaced the
États généraux de Provence.
2. In the eighteenth century a distinction was made between the grands pays d’États
(Brittany, Languedoc, Burgundy and Provence) and the petits pays d’États (Flandre
wallonne, Artois, Cambrésis, Béarn, Basse Navarre, Bigorre, Soule, Nébouzan and comté
de Foix).
3. MONTESQUIEU, 1748, book XIII, Ch. XIX.
4. R. J. IVES, 2003, p. 2-3.
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small group of reformers rallied around the ýgure of Vincent de Gournay,
intendant du commerce.5 Their ideas beneýted from the support of Chrétien
Lamoignon de Malesherbes, directeur de la Librairie between 1751 and
1763, and, as such, in charge of the royal policy concerning the censorship
of books. This period of relative freedom of expression ended with the
royal declaration of 28 March 1764, which reserved to the sovereign courts
the right to advise the king on political matters. In 1774, according to Joël
Félix, the appointment of Turgot as controller-general initiated a return to
the freedom of the 1750s. The historian bases his assertion on a quantitative
analysis of ýnancial publications between 1660 and 1789, which shows that
nearly half of the corpus was published in the last decade of the Ancien
Régime.6 Jacques Necker played a key role in this literary explosion with the
publication of his Compte rendu au Roi (1781), a practical demonstration of
the new paradigm he intended to implement in ýnancial matters, that of the
public management of state ýnances.7
The quest for transparency in ýnancial matters was fuelled by broader
discussion about the resources of the kingdom and the means of increasing
the revenue of the state. The debate reached a high point in 1762 when
Roussel de la Tour published La Richesse de l’État, in which he called for
the introduction of a progressive tax to be levied on taxpayers which would
be divided into twenty classes of revenue. In the meantime, Mirabeau had
published a revised version of his work on the provincial estates (1758)
where he praised their ability to use their credit on behalf of the king.8 This
set up a new route for raising additional revenue which, as is well known,
would be adopted later by Jacques Necker.9
The atmosphere of discussion and experimentation surrounding the
issue of transparency in politics, especially in the realm of ýnance, had
a profound impact on administration and the development of the science
of administration. As Marie-Laure Legay and Antonella Alimento have
shown, such developments were particularly noticeable in the ýeld of
public accountancy.10 This article aims to show, however, that these new
concerns were not limited to coteries in Versailles and the Parisian elites,
but also developed within the pays d’États as a result of their administrative
5. Ibidem, p. 8.
6. J. FÉLIX, 1999, p. 19-26.
7. M.-L. LEGAY, 2011, p. 184.
8. ROUSSEL DE LA TOUR, 1764;MIRABEAU, 1758.
9. Ibidem, p. 190.
10. A. ALIMENTO, 2008.
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autonomy and the challenges the provincial estates had to respond to in the
course of administering local affairs. One major challenge was increased
ýscal pressure from Versailles. From 1749, provincial estates were asked
to borrow on behalf of the king, especially after 1776 and the appointment
of Jacques Necker. As a result, the ýnancial role of the provincial estates
expanded considerably in the last decade of the Ancien Régime. This
evolution was not without precedent. Between 1658 and 1675, the estates
of Languedoc, Brittany and Burgundy, had worked towards the creation
of a provincial ýscal system capable of funding a public debt in order to
satisfy royal demands.11 It would be a mistake, however, to interpret the
rapid increase in the size of the public debt during the second half of the
eighteenth century as a sign of the absolute victory of the monarchy over
representative institutions, their role and identity. In these provinces, the
political culture remained closely tied to the notions of representation and
consent. In terms of political and ýscal change, the main evolution between
these two periods concerned the determination of provincial estates to
implement and rationalise public policies on the basis of administrative
knowledge. In the second half of the eighteenth century, the provincial
assemblies, as we will see, successfully created a “science of the estates” in
response to the stimuli of both the central government and the intellectual
climate of the time.
1. The Monarchy and the estates:
from coercive taxation to þnancial control
In the age of the Absolute monarchy, the persistence of some of the
medieval provincial estates can be explained by their ability to contribute
to the king’s ýnances. In Burgundy, the potential for conþict started in 1659
when Louis XIV transferred the estates to the castle of Noyers, in a small
town situated in the north of the province. This exile was the king’s reaction
to the failure of the negotiation with the États held in Dijon in 1658: on this
occasion the estates, acting with the Parlement de Dijon, had ýrmly denied
a royal demand for a million livres as a don gratuit extraordinaire because
the levy was not assigned for payment of speciýc expenditure, as was
11. M.-L. LEGAY, 2002, p. 151-171. According to this author, the provincial estates
issued a total of 60 loans to the monarchy between 1740 and 1789: 20 in Languedoc, 17
in Burgundy and 8 in Brittany. The capital raised amounted to 222 million livres tournois.
The estates of Languedoc, which borrowed 164 million for the king, were the principal
providers of capital (64%). Nevertheless, as Marie-Laure Legay concludes, provincial credit
was underemployed by the monarchy: the loans issued by the provincial estates represented
only nine per cent of the royal debt in 1790.
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normally the case.12 In 1659, the king requested payment of 8 million livres
from the provincial estates of Languedoc but, in exchange, he conýrmed
the important edict of 1649 concerning their rights and privileges.13 In
Brittany, the conþict between the monarchy and the provincial estates
occurred in 1675; until that moment, the États had generally agreed to pay,
after a protracted bargaining process that resulted in a reduction of the
king’s demands. After the crisis of 1675, the monarchy had stronger control
over the assembly: the annual don gratuit varied from one million livres
in peacetime to 1.5 million in wartime. Consequently, in the ýrst years of
Louis XIV’s personal rule, the monarchy had brought the main provincial
assemblies of the realm under control and was able to take advantage of
their ýscal power and legitimacy.
Louis XV’s and Louis XVI’s military ventures in the War of Polish
succession (1733-1738), the war of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748), the
Seven Year’s War (1756-1763) and the American War (1778-1783) meant
that the thirst for money continued well into the last century of the Ancien
Régime. The province of Brittany, which submitted a biennial list of its
grievances to the king, is an interesting observatory from which to examine
provincial attitudes towards ýscal pressure. The grievances of 1778 reveal
the extent to which the vocabulary of enlightened political discourse
pervaded discussions in the provincial estates and how its members relied
on economic and ýnancial arguments to convince the king of the province’s
rights. Among the grievances, which were listed numerically, several articles
complained about the excessive burden of taxes, including the capitation,
the costs of warfare, and the weight of provincial debts. In the grievances,
the estates presented themselves as the safeguard of the ýnancial contract
concluded with the royal commissioners. This was a bold claim in an era
of alleged royal absolute power. The increase in the level of taxation was
also presented as a threat to the general economy and, thus, to the ýscal
interest of the crown: taxes, they wrote, “would soon result in total ruin;
for if the prices of goods have increased it is only because of a decrease in
their quantity and because for many years the land has produced only very
meagre harvests, therefore the farmer has lost much more by the scarcity
of products than he appears to have gained through price increases”.14
12. J. LOISEAU, 2014, p. 82-85.
13. The edict of 1649 cancelled the edict of Beziers (1632) which had suspended
the provincial assembly in response to the revolt of the provincial governor, the Duke of
Montmorency.
14. Archives départementales d’Ille-et-Vilaine (AD35), fonds des États, C-2846 (1778):
“Les progrès d’une pareille conséquence conduiraient bientôt à une dépouille entière ; car
si les productions ont augmenté de prix, ce n’est que parce qu’elle a beaucoup diminué de
Histoire & Mesure, 2015, XXX-2
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According to the estates, the land-holders were condemned to poverty. They
also complained about an additional levy of troops in the province and stated
that demands for young men to serve the king’s military commitments
contributed to the depopulation of Brittany. It is likely that the aim of this
demographic observation was to support their request to the government that
the capitation should not be increased: “if the expenses occasioned by the
current war do not allow the abolition of the capitation, we beg to point out
to your majesty that equality must be maintained between all the provinces
of his kingdom; in the general distribution of taxes none is less populated
than Brittany with regard to its size and there is no other province where the
capitation is so heavy.”15 The estates also remonstrated that the excesses of
the capitation were so well-known that the crown had reduced its burden
in 1762. The cahier of 1778 highlights the ways in which the assembly used
rhetorical skills and economic arguments to assess and discuss the burden
and the consequences of taxation, and the fact that, in doing so, they were
moving beyond the legal discourse that had been, traditionally, used to
defend provincial privileges.
One could argue that the Bretons’s list of grievances exaggerated the
real situation of their province or that it was exceptional. But Burgundy
had similar complaints. Data concerning Burgundian ýscal contributions
in the eighteenth century (see Figure 1) underline the extent of the ýnancial
stress the province had to face. If, on average, the annual revenue from
taxes remained stable, between 5 and 6 million livres, the provincial debt
grew considerably after 1740. Although these nominal ýgures do not take
into account changes in the silver value of the livre tournois before its
stabilisation in 1726, the rise in public debt was very substantial. On this
ground, one can only agree with Julian Swann’s assertion that, by the end
of the Ancien Régime, “the Estates were burdened with debt”.16 As Figure 2
shows, the bulk of the capital debt of the province of Burgundy (41.3 million
in 1784) was for loans issued by the estates on behalf of the king (70%).
quantité et que depuis bien des années les terres n’ont produit que de très faibles récoltes,
ainsi le cultivateur a beaucoup plus perdu par la disette des fruits qu’il ne paraît avoir gagné
par l’accroissement de leur prix.”
15. Ibidem, “Si les dépenses que la guerre actuelle occasionne s’opposent à la
suppression de la capitation qu’il nous soit permis de représenter à votre majesté que l’égalité
doit être gardée entre toutes les provinces de son royaume dans la répartition générale des
impositions aucune n’est moins peuplée que la Bretagne relativement à son étendue et il n’en
est aucune où la capitation soit aussi considérable.”
16. J. SWANN, 2003, p. 323.
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Figure 1. Tax revenue and debt in Burgundy, 1712-1789
Source. AD21, C-3413.
Figure 2. The structure of the Burgundian public debt in 1784
Source. AD21, C-3413.
This ýnancial situation was the result of Jacques Necker’s appointment
as directeur général du trésor royal (1776-1781) and his ýnancial policy
to fund the American War. The annual capital raised by the estates of
Burgundy for the royal treasury was multiplied by a factor of 8 and reached
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Figure 3). Between 1742 and 1770, the Contrôle général des þnances had
raised 27 million livres in loans, less than Necker obtained in just three
years. This situation was similar in all the pays d’États, as Marie-Laure
Legay has demonstrated.17 This suggests that use of provincial credit was
largely a discovery of Jacques Necker’s.
Figure 3. The Estates of Burgundy as bankers of the king (1742-1783)
Source. AD21, C-3413.
How did Necker succeed in managing this policy? His success in
Burgundy depended on his knowledge of its ýnancial situation. The most
important among the ofýcers of the estates was the trésorier général. The
ofýce had been purchased from the king in 1609 and, in theory, the trésorier
généralwas appointed by the general assembly. In fact, he was chosen by the
governor of the province, Louis-Henri de Bourbon, the so-called vice-roy of
Burgundy. After this governor’s death in 1740, and during the minority of
his successor Louis-Joseph, the royal administration was able to acquire the
ability to appoint the trésorier général as well as the élus des ordres, i.e.,
the men who were actually in charge of the administration of the province
during the three-year period of recess between each of the meetings of
the three estates of the province. In fact, Louis-Joseph never regained his
predecessor’s powers, even after he became full governor of the province in
17. M.-L. LEGAY, 2002, p. 155-156.
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1754.18 This meant that the Contrôleur général des þnances had a reliable
ally at the heart of the administration of the estates. The trésorier général
had to prepare at least two reports per year for the Contrôleur général. One
of the reports summarized the arrears due from the accounts of the previous
year and the other was a survey of the fonds libres.19 On 22 November 1777,
Antoine Chartraire de Montigny, trésorier général of the estates (the ofýce
which had been held by his family since the beginning of the century),
wrote in his second report:
“if the king sought now to use the credit of the province, you will see that there
are already about 800,000 livres available that could be assigned to it […] these
800,000 livres thus allow for the present the possibility of issuing a loan of 8
million.”20
These funds (tax revenue) were available because the provincial
estates, in order to pay their share of the Vingtième, issued self-amortising
loans (emprunts à terme) which were fully reimbursed after a number of
years. The search for available funds was therefore the main goal of the
Contrôle général. To this end, speciýc instruments were developed by the
administration to assess the ýscal and ýnancial situation of Burgundy. It was
a kind of ýnancial dashboard that combined several tables. The ýrst table
was produced in 1778: it took the form of a new statement of annual revenue
which, for each type of tax, provided detailed information about the funds
available (see Appendix 1).21 For instance, in the case of the don gratuit, a
clerk in Versailles observed that 30,513 livres remained unspent because
the crown had allocated only 769,487 livres out of a fund of 800,000 livres
assigned to pay the expenditures of the royal family. The amount of the
revenue available from each fund was calculated in the right-hand side of
the table and the total of the funds available was summed up at the bottom.
This enabled the Contrôle général to measure the capacity of the estates to
service a new loan on behalf of the king. In another table, the clerk provided
an annual statement of the current loans that included three ýgures: the
capital of the initial loan, the capital reimbursed and the outstanding debt.
As a precursor of modern repayment schedules, these documents provided
the royal administration with the information needed to plan for new loans.
18. S. PANNEKOUCKE, 2010, p. 45 and p. 151.
19. Existing funds.
20. Archives nationales (AN), H. 139, fol. 84: “si le roi songeait dès à présent à se
servir (du crédit de la province) vous voyez déjà qu’il y a 800 000 livres environ propres à
leur servir d’assignat libre […] les 800 000 livres actuellement libres laissent donc dans le
moment présent la possibilité d’avoir un emprunt de 8 millions.”
21. AN, H. 139, fol. 98.
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The statement for 1784, for example, clearly indicated that two loans each
of three millions negotiated in 1766 and 1769 would be entirely reimbursed
in 1783 and 1787; the maturity date of the seven other loans issued between
1778 and 1783 was also mentioned.22 Another document dating from 1779
exempliýes the central administration’s desire to have access to all the
available data concerning the king’s debts in Burgundy: for each loan, this
document recorded details about its issue, the capital raised, the annual cost
of servicing the annual interests and payment of the principal, the sum of
the interests and principal, the capital to be refunded in 1779 and the sum of
the capital and interests to be paid in 1780 (Appendix 3).23 By providing the
Contrôle général with a dynamic view of the debt and its repayment, this
table facilitated the management of public debts and planning for the future.
Time was money. Measuring time in order closely to control the
movement of money was an essential feature of Jacques Necker’s ýnancial
administration. This policy is well-documented for Burgundy, probably
because its treasurer was nominated by the king. This is less the case for
other provinces. It is nevertheless clear that the same policy was pursued
by the Contrôle général. In 1781, for instance, a description of the ýscal
and ýnancial situation of the pays d’États was produced by the ýnance
ministry. This document analysed the situation of Burgundy, Languedoc
and Brittany, as well as Provence, Artois and Bresse, with the purpose of
ýnding revenue that could be used as collateral of new loans for the beneýt
of the king.24 A more detailed document entitled pays d’États and dated
21 August 1782 reveals the extent to which the royal administration was
pursuing the same objective and applying the same methods in the other
pays d’états. The author, probably an ofýce clerk, argued that the king could
obtain new loans totalling 20 million livres: 9 million from Languedoc,
3 million from Burgundy and 8 million from Brittany. The demand was to
be justiýed by an evaluation of the ýnancial position of each province:
“We have thought necessary to bring to the minister’s attention information
about the particular situation of the loans currently opened and the demands that
could be made to the estates of Languedoc, Brittany and Burgundy as the only
provinces from which we can expect resources of that kind for 1783 or 1784. The
minister will see in from the attached papers …”25
22. Ibidem, fol. 114.
23. AN, H.139, fol. 6.
24. AN, H.139, fol. 204-205.
25. AN, H. 138, fol. 78 passim: “On a pensé qu’il était nécessaire de mettre sous les
yeux du Ministre un renseignement de la situation particulière des emprunts actuellement
ouverts et des demandes qui pourraient être faites aux États du Languedoc, de la Bretagne et
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This document presents the provinces’ ýnancial situation in a much
more hypothetical manner than was the case for Burgundy. But the rationale
behind the collection and analysis of the information was the same. For
instance, comments about Languedoc mention the existence of “an available
fund of 8 to 900,000 livres” as a potential source of credit but raise doubts
about the actual ýgure. In Brittany, the clerk expressed his surprise at the
slowness with which the loan of 12 million livres had been underwritten
in 1782: investors had only purchased 6 million.26 This knowledge had an
impact on the discussion of new loans during the session of each estate and
was used as a political tool. For instance, the clerk advised caution about
Brittany: the current state of affairs seemed to exclude a new request being
presented at the coming session of the estates.27
The publication in February 1781 of Necker’sCompte rendu au Roi can
thus be understood as the ýnal step in the evolution toward a more thorough
knowledge of the state of French ýnance. Under Necker’s administration,
the ýnancial tables analysed above became more numerous and were more
sophisticated. To fund warfare, ministers drew upon provincial credit.
Thanks to the collection and analysis of information, this credit was better
understood and better managed by the ministry. The provincial estates were
subjected to accurate examination of their ýscal capacity to meet the king’s
demands or capacity to borrow on his behalf, especially under Necker’s
administration. This policy generated new administrative tools, in the form
of ýnancial tables, that lifted the veil of secrecy that had been covering
provincial ýnances.
2. The birth of a provincial panoptical view
The information policy pursued by the contrôle général resulted in the
provincial estates producing their own ýgures. In Burgundy, a document
dating from 1782 contains a wonderful hand-drawn table with some
de la Bourgogne comme étant les seuls pays dont on peut espérer des ressources de ce genre
pour 1783 ou 1784. Le Ministre verra par les feuilles ci-jointes…”
26. Ibidem, fol. 79: “M. de Montessuy prétend qu’il peut y avoir un fonds libre de 8 à
900 000 livres qui permettraient la demande d’un emprunt de 8 millions”; and fol. 89: “La
lenteur qu’il y a eu dans la rentrée de cet emprunt doit faire présumer qu’il ne pourra se
perfectionner que pendant le reste de cette année et la plus grande partie de la prochaine.”
27. Ibidem, fol. 83: “Quoi qu’il en soit, il faut partir de l’état présent des choses ; il
semblerait devoir exclure une nouvelle demande à la tenue des états qui va se faire les
derniers mois de cette année” (1782).
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ornamental lettering (see Appendix 4).28 The front page of the document
is a table which gives a clear and exhaustive inventory of all the taxes the
province had to pay to the king (taillon, garnisons, subsistance, octrois,
don gratuit, capitation, vingtième). All of these taxes reþected episodes in
the ýnancial history of the province. The author − or authors − of this table,
who are unknown member(s) of the estates’ administration, listed, under
each entry, all the sums (such as gratiýcations and arrears, as well as the
revenue from additional taxes) which were assigned on each of the principal
taxes. With its multiple taxes and sources of income, the document shows
the complexity of Burgundian ýnances and the need for clariýcation. The
back page of the document listed the loans issued on behalf of the province
itself (i.e., it excluded loans for the king) and listed their causes as well as
the relevant ýnancial information (total amount, interest, assignations and
additional remarks). This well-crafted document was clearly intended to
measure the receipts, expenses and debts of the province, and to record
their history. Consequently, it helped to predict and manage the ýnancial
future. The most innovative element of the table was that it provided
administrators with the ýrst ofýcial assessment of provincial debt. The debt
cost was 440,000 livres a year, not including the loans on behalf of the king
which were in fact ýnanced by the crown through tax relief. Thus, with this
document ýnancial secrecy was brought to an end, and this evolution was
the result of a decision made by the bureau des élus itself.29
When presented with the ýscal report of the province in 1784, the
chamber of the nobility was so pleased that they proposed that the bureau
des élus be charged with all ýnancial investigations in the future.30However,
they raised four questions and asked for answers: these concerned the capital
and cost of all debts, the amount of all available funds, and the total of
ordinary and extraordinary expenses. The nobility was therefore requesting
information about expenditure — leaving aside questions of receipts —
which is not surprising as it was a threat to their ýscal privileges. From
1782, the third estate regularly asked to be discharged from the expenses
payable to the clergy or the nobility, such as the wages of the capitaine of
the chamber of the nobility. Not until the winter of 1788 did the chamber of
the nobility in the estates agree to renounce its privileges.
28. Archives départementales de la Côte-d’Or (AD21): C-3413, fol. 1-60.
29. The executive committee was composed of four members “elected” by the estates
(one for the clergy, one for the nobility and two for the third etsate), and three states’ ofýcers.
Its task was to administer the provincial affairs between the plenary sessions of the estates.
30. The three orders deliberated separately during the meeting of the general estates,
with the exception of the opening and concluding sessions.
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Financial tables also appeared in Brittany. In 1782, the commission
intermédiaire, which was the executive commission of the provincial
estates, prepared an exhaustive statement of the debts since 1732. The table
had four columns and listed the date of, and reasons for, the loans as well
as the capital amounts and interest (in two columns). Another table was
prepared to describe the history of the loans undertaken by the province
on behalf of the king. With this document, the administrators were able to
assess the public debt of the province, which was around 50 million livres
(Appendixes 5 and 6).31
No such tables have been found yet in the archives of the provincial
estates of Languedoc. But a well-known document, produced seven years
after Necker’s publication of the Crown’s revenue and expenditure, is
evidence that concerns in Languedocwere similar to those already discussed
for Burgundy and Brittany. Entitled Compte rendu des impositions et des
dépenses générales de la province de Languedoc (1789), this document
followed a deliberation of the estates (18 January 1788) which sought to
“distinguish all of the taxes and expenses and to classify them according
to their object and nature […]. The result of this classiýcation has revealed
with certainty which sums are paid to the royal treasury or by the estates
on behalf of the king and which are those in fact allocated to the particular
costs of the administration of the estates. Hence the division of revenue
(deniers) between deniers royaux and deniers provinciaux.”32 The table of
contents reþects this duality, with separate sections for royal and provincial
revenue. Both sections provide ýscal tables which are similar to those
already analysed for Burgundy and Brittany, although those for Languedoc
are less detailed. The register summarised the loans raised on behalf of the
king in two columns, one for the capital repaid (35 million livres) and the
other for the outstanding capital on 1st June 1789 (69 million livres).33 Two
other tables dealt with the loans issued for payment of taxes or for the king’s
31. AD35 : fonds de la commission intermédiaire, C-3846.
32. “Leur premier soin est de se faire représenter les départements des impositions,
les états de distribution, les états d’intérêts, les comptes, en un mot toutes les pièces qui
leur parurent nécessaires pour établir la distinction de toutes les impositions, de toutes les
dépenses et pour les classer, eu égard à leur objet et à leur déýnition […]. L’effet de cette
classiýcation a été de faire connaître avec évidence quelles sont les sommes versées aux
caisses royales ou payées par les états à la décharge du roi et quelles sont celles qui sont
celles véritablement destinées aux dépenses particulières de l’administration des états. De
là, la division des deniers en deniers royaux et deniers provinciaux”, in Compte rendu des
impositions et des dépenses générales de la province de Languedoc, d’après les départements
et les états de distribution, Montpellier, Jean Martel Ainé, Imprimeur ordinaire du roi et des
états généraux de la province de Languedoc, 1789.
33. E. PÉLAQUIER, 2014, p. 246.
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service, and for funding the administrative costs incurred by the province
itself. In Languedoc, however, these two tables indicated only the cost of
the bonds that the estates had to pay in exchange for capital borrowed for
contracts over the previous half century, around 1.3 million livres for a
capital of 26 million.34
It is therefore clear that by the end of the Ancien Régime the three
main provincial estates of the realm were using new documents, in the form
of tables, to evaluate their ýnancial situation with respect to expenditure,
revenue and debt. The end of the secrecy that surrounded ýnancial
administration, which the inner circle of the estates was only familiar with,
was symbolic of a new consciousness concerning the needs of provincial
administrators in order to better fulýl their mission. This new attitude
toward internal transparency and external publicity meant that all the
members of the estates, and probably outsiders, became aware of the key
elements of provincial ýnances!35 In Burgundy, this meant publicizing the
size of the province’s debts: 41.3 million livres (29.5 million on behalf of the
king, 9.8 million on behalf of the province, 2 million to ýnance the Canal
of Burgundy). These calculations are to be understood in relation to the
publication of Necker’s Traité de l’administration des þnances de la France
(1784) which included two chapters dedicated to French expenditure and the
debts of the state. The same concern was simultaneously at work in both
political arenas.36
The political aim behind these innovations was, as was usually
claimed in the documents themselves, the improvement of the provincial
common good. It is true that the tables, as we have seen, could be used
as levers for negotiating with the crown. They also became a kind of
weapon in the hands of the magistrates of the Parlements in their struggle
against royal authority. Excluded from the estates by their profession, these
noblemen, who were the main and longstanding creditors of the province,
were very well informed about the debates held in the general assembly.37
For instance, when Louis XVI requested a new loan of 3 million livres on
the province’s credit, the Parlement of Dijon refused to register the new
34. Ibidem, p. 247.
35. “The state of affairs has become so apparent that the public, which nowadays is
perfectly able to do the calculation, considers bankruptcy as unavoidable”: a statement by
L’Averdy in 1768 quoted by J. FÉLIX, 2013, p. 115.
36. J. NECKER, 1785, vol. 2, Ch. XI “Recherches et considérations générales sur les
dettes de l’État” and Ch. XII “Tableau des dépenses de la France”.
37. P. DE VIVO, 2007, p. 40.
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edict. The magistrates justiýed their opposition as follows: “a new loan will
exceed the province’s capacity […] the consent of its administrators comes
from an excess of zeal”.38 The Parlement of Dijon denounced both the king
and the estates, in part because its members were convinced they were the
only real Senate able to represent the French people and the public good.
Curiously, the Parlement’s criticism occurred when skills developed by the
provincial administrators, which they called the “science of the estates”,
equipped them with the knowledge that made them more capable than ever
of managing the public affairs of the province.
The empowerment of Burgundian estates took place between 1775 and
1778, and coincided with the administration and leadership of three new élus:
the abbé Antoine de la Goutte, Jacques-François Damas, marquis of Antigny,
and Jean-FrançoisMaufoux, themayor of Beaune. They joined fourmembers
of the permanent commission, namely the mayor of Dijon as perpetual élu,
the élu du roi and two deputies from the Chambre des comptes. They issued
three acts that implemented a new ýscal and accounting paradigm. The new
élus may have been chosen for that very reason, although this is impossible
to ascertain. Élus were usually creatures of the provincial governor, the
prince of Condé, or of the royal administration. But this very group of élus,
especially Antoine de la Goutte, demonstrated a stubborn determination in
enforcing their own views.39On 23 December 1775, the ýrst decision ordered
that each of the province’s 15 tax collectors visit his respective district to
ensure a fair distribution of the ýscal burden between the villages and among
the taxpayers.40 The second decision (10 January 1776) imposed the renewal
of all tax rolls by means of a commission to be composed of a representative
of the local seigneur (lord), representatives of each of the communities and
up to three representatives of the non-resident landowners. This amounted to
nothing less than a ýrst step toward the introduction of a cadastral system,
which was a common feature in the provinces of southern France but which
had been rejected in 1763 when contrôleur généralBertin had tried to extend
cadastres to the whole realm. The purpose was to facilitate evaluation of
the revenue of all the landowners of the province and to reduce tax evasion
by allowing provincial tax administrators to assess the vingtième on the
revenue more accurately. The last of the three decisions (1st February 1776)
implemented by these independently minded élus concerned the trésorier
général who was not allowed to borrow money to pay taxes. The declaration
38. AN, série H. 138, fol. 299-304: “Un nouvel emprunt est au-dessus des forces de la
province […] le consentement de ses administrateurs est un excès de zèle.”
39. AD21, C-3434.
40. J. SWANN, 2003, p. 334.
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of the élus insisted that “accurate and detailed tables of expenses, debts
and receipts”41 would have to be drawn up each year and presented to them.
Moreover, the trésorier général was ordered to submit his accounts every
three years to the whole assembly of the general estates (200 members
on average). That decision meant that members of the assembly had been
previously used to authorising taxes without any knowledge of the ýnancial
situation of the province.
The new political economy involved a determination to increase the tax
paid by the province’s wealthier subjects and to reduce borrowing. This was
admittedly the expression of traditional economic views which had been
presented by Jean Bodin in his major book, the Six Livres de la République,
published in 1576. He argued that direct taxation was one of the seven
possible means for the State to ýnd the money it needed. Nonetheless, he
argued that borrowing was a solution of last resort, to be used only if the six
others had failed.42While much of the estates’ views on administration was
traditional, they adopted signiýcant new modern elements: the élus justiýed
their innovations as an attempt to dispel “confusion” and “obscurity” with
the aim of implementing a “healthy administration […] which was not
stumbling like a blind person anymore”.43
These three decisions broke drastically with the past, in at least two
ways. Firstly, they put an end to the ýnancial secrecy in the province
by stipulating that the entire assembly be given access to the province’s
accounting records. Secondly, they broke away from traditional accounting
methods by adding a third category, the public debt, to the pre-existing
categories of revenue and expenditure. This meant that for the ýrst time
in the accounting history of the province administrators could have an
accurate view and assessment of its ýnances. Before 1776, debts were
classiýed as both receipt and expense. This meant that provincial accounts
were always perfectly balanced: “comptes borgnes et þscalité aveugle”
summarized Marcel Bouchard in 1954!44 According to Katia Béguin, the
reason provincial administrators chose to calculate this way was that loans
were understood to be a property of the estates.45 Against the payment of
annual arrears of bonds, the capital borrowed by the estates remained their
41. AD21, C-3229, fol. 425 and subsequent: “des tableaux exacts et détaillés des
charges, dettes et recettes seront tenus et présentés aux élus chaque année”.
42. J. BODIN, vol. VI, Ch. II “Des ýnances”.
43. Ibidem.
44. M. BOUCHARD, 1954.
45. K. BÉGUIN, 2012.
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property until they decided to reimburse it in full. This was not necessarily
good news, for in Burgundy high rates of interest − usually 5% − were
paid to creditors. This accounting change was therefore the sign of a new
representation of loans no longer seen as an acquisition but rather as a sum
to be reimbursed with interest. This reform was similar to that of Turgot
who in 1775-1776 sought to better control accounting methods and to reduce
the nation’s debts.46
Given the radical nature of the changes implemented by the élus, it is
not surprising that the royal council, twomonths after the disgrace of Turgot,
decided to suspend the three declarations (28 July 1776). The changes they
tried to implement were directly opposed to the interests of the Burgundian
ofýce-holders, especially those in the judiciary, who had been the traditional
creditors of the estates. In scrutinizing the work of the trésorier général and
in proclaiming their right to know the details of ýnancial mechanisms in the
province, the new administrators threatened the political and social bases of
absolute obedience in the province.
In both Burgundy and Brittany, ýnancial tables made their appearance
in the last decade of theAncienRégime. These newadministrative documents
sought to help the executive committees and general assemblies improve the
ýnancial management of these provinces. At ýrst glance, these documents
may appear to be simple replicas of the accounting innovations coming out
of the contrôle général. In order to properly examine the origins of the
changes it is necessary to situate them in the broader context of provincial
political literature.
3. Towards a science of the provincial estates
In truth, the political debate on the use of ýnancial knowledge to
improve the common good occurred at the provincial, as well as the national,
level. The demand for knowledge concerning provincial administration
involved not only ýnancial knowledge, but more generally the “science of
the estates”, as can be demonstrated by examining the case ofBrittany. Since
1732, there had existed a handbook for the administration of the province.
EntitledMémoire sur les états de Bretagne,47 it aimed to empower its readers
− doubtless the members of the forthcoming commission intermédiaire −
equipping them with knowledge of administrative subjects. This manuscript
46. M.-L. LEGAY, 2012, p. 180-181.
47. AD35, C-6046/1.
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document, structured in seven untitled chapters and ýfty “entries”, was the
ýrst attempt to summarize the practice of the estates in dealing with issues
such as the convening of the estates, membership, the role of each ofýcer,
wages, and precedence within and between orders.
Around the same time, the abbot Du Breuil de Pontbriand wrote
his Traité historique des États (1567-1754), which was an attempt to
encapsulate the entire world of the estates.48 It was a collection of several
books, including the livre des impôts et billots and the livre des fouages. In
the livre des impôts, the abbot described the indirect tax which the estates
had particularly increased, under the false name of “loan on the fouages”,
in order to satisfy the ýnancial will of the monarchy. The author drew a
precise picture of the history of that tax from 1642 to 1733, explaining its
framework, its vocabulary and the birth of annuity contracts. A general
table, in three columns for dates, amount and total capital plus interest for
each loan ended the historical analysis.
Thirty years later, in 1762, amanuscript dictionary of the administration
of Brittany completed the range of tools depicting the provincial
administration of the estates on the subject of ýnances and taxes.49The detail
and the depth of the analysis of the past and present reþect the concerns and
intellectual structures of the Enlightenment, as we can see in the ýfteen-
page article on the don gratuit.50 The author provided a simple deýnition
of the don gratuit which was “once a small free gift to the king when he
honoured with his presence the session of the estates and then an ordinary
expense linked to the needs of the State”.51 The article contains a record of
the amount since 1671 and samples of political debates raised by the king’s
demand for it. Moreover, twenty years later, in 1782, a certain sieur Chardel
provided the members of the commission intermédiaire with another large
book: the Traité sur l’administration de la commission intermédiaire.52
In Brittany, members of the commission and probably a larger part
of the estates could therefore rely on these works of political combining
history, public ýnance and institutional considerations, that had been
48. AD35, C-6046/2.
49. AD35, C-6058/1.
50. Ibidem, fol. 251-267.
51. Ibidem, fol. 251 : “Le don gratuit n’était dans son origine qu’un présent volontaire
et peu considérable que les états assemblés faisaient au roi lorsque Sa majesté les honorait de




compiled between 1732 and 1762. The process was similar in Burgundy,
albeit with a slight delay. Before the preparation of ýnancial tables in 1782,
a former “alcade of the third estate”, a member of the estates appointed
to evaluate the quality of administration, Jean-Baptiste Gautherin, began
work on aMémoire sur la Bourgogne considérée comme un pays d’États,53
the ýrst manual of Burgundian administrative history. With 84 chapters,
the “book” presents the complexity of the ýnancial machinery of the
institution with a particular emphasis on ýscal matters. At an unknown
date, Gautherin passed the task of preparing the unýnished work on to
Philibert-Hugues Gueneau d’Aumont, mayor of Semur-en-Auxois, the last
élu of the third estate.
We have no indication of what was the intended use of these writings,
but their mere existence demonstrates the desire both to have and to
disseminate information through the recording of the matters relating
to the administration. This science of the estates sought to enlighten in
order to improve the management of provinces by members of the estates
themselves. Those writings were therefore part of a process aiming at more
transparency. In Brittany, that kind of concern probably played a role in
stimulating debate concerning the publicizing of the provincial discussions
and the necessity of empowering individuals other than only the members
of the estates to propose new measures. Precisely what was forbidden by the
royal declaration of 1764.
In 1785, in a report to the estates, one of the most prominent nobleman
of the province, M. de Boisgelin de Cucé, chairman of the chamber of the
nobility, raised the question of the political secrecy surrounding the estates
or, more precisely, “the prompt and simple means they could use to facilitate
instruction and increase the spread of knowledge in the province”.54 He
was motivated by the usual political aim, the improvement of the public
good, arguing that “the publicizing of reports […] would excite the zeal of
a larger number of citizens throughout the province […]. In Brittany the
useful thought of a single citizen could contribute to the happiness of two
million people”.55 But his key argument in favour of making information
53. AD21, 1 F 460.
54. AD35, 1 J. 13, fol. 1: “Je leur soumets les réþexions que j’ai faites sur les moyens
prompts et simples qu’ils pourraient employer pour faciliter l’instruction et augmenter les
connaissances répandues dans la province.”
55. Ibidem, fol. 14 and 16: “La publicité des mémoires sur des objets intéressants qui
auraient été lus dans nos séances exciterait le zèle d’un plus grand nombre de citoyens de
tous les ordres […]. Dans la Bretagne une pensée utile d’un seul citoyen peut contribuer au
bonheur de deux millions d’hommes.”
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public was that the estates dealt with administrative business rather than
“politique”, a word which meant foreign policy at the time and was closely
related to the notions of secrecy: “there are secrets in policy, but there
should not be any in administration; in the estates we only deal with public
and national interests, we have no foreign power of whom to be suspicious,
we have no enemies to fear, we thus have nothing to hide and no secrets to
keep from our fellow citizens”.56 The proposal to share provincial affairs
with an enlarged public, including all of those who wanted “to be engaged
in the study” of administration,57 reminds us of Sweden during the age
of liberty (1718-1772), where a nobleman, Lars Herman Gyllenhaal, also
proposed the same type of political change in 1769,58 and of the fact that the
publication of the transcriptions of the English Parliamentary debates began
in 1771. In the case of Brittany, Boisgelin de Cucé, worried about the costs
of printing and distribution, advised that only those documents necessary
for exact knowledge be made public.59 It is unclear whether he intended the
publications to include ýnancial tables.
In any case, despite the fact that Boisgelin de Cucé’s proposal was
never implemented, ýnancial information was available in Brittany just as
political information was in early modern Venice.60 Pamphlets such as La
confession de la Sentinelle and La Sentinelle de la noblessewritten by Jean-
François Chasseboeuf (Volney) by the end of 1788 and during the spring of
1789 show how well-informed part of the literate elite was when it came to
the types of ýnancial matters discussed by the estates, and the nature and
extent of ýscal inequality between the nobility and the third estate.61 An
active policy of publication was thus not the sole means for public opinion
56. Ibidem, fol. 5: “Il y a des secrets pour la politique, il ne doit point en exister sur
l’administration ; il ne s’agit dans les états que des intérêts publics et nationaux, nous n’avons
point de puissance étrangère à suspecter, nous n’avons point d’ennemis à craindre, nous
n’avons donc rien à dissimuler et nous ne devons rien cacher à nos concitoyens.”
57. Ibidem, fol. 1: “J’ai senti M.M. dès le premier instant que je me suis occupé des
affaires de la Province combien il était difýcile de s’en instruire : cette difýculté m’a fait
réþéchir sur les moyens qu’on pouvait employer pour vaincre les obstacles que rencontrent
les citoyens qui veulent se livrer à l’étude de notre administration.”
58. P. IHALAINEN, 2010, p. 203. He proposed that “some questions of ýnance and foreign
policy could be discussed in the plenary sessions of the Estates, including the Peasant Estate,
instead of being conýned to the exclusive Secret Committee”, p. 203.
59. AD35, 1 J. 13, fol. 22.
60. P. DEVIVO, 2007, p. 120: “Whether by accident or on purpose, information constantly
spilled out from the government to move from the centre to the periphery of Venice, from
the council halls inside the ducal palace to a pharmacy at the gates of the arsenal. […] Much
political communication arose out of disclosures originating in the political arena.”
61. R. DUPUY, 2000, p. 69 and subsequent.
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to be informed. In Languedoc, before the publication of the Compte rendu
des Impositions of 1789, the councillor Muret, an ofýcer of theChambre des
comptes, wrote repeatedly to the contrôleur général des Finances and to the
estates of Languedoc in order to defend his project for ýscal reform that was
based on his desire “to create […] proportional equality in the distribution
of taxes, the least imperfect solution”.62 What is suggestive in his work is
that Muret wrote as a mathematician rather than as an administrator like
Boisgelin de Cucé or as a political agitator like Volney. He approached the
problem of ýscal equality as a theorem to be solved: “the half circle ACB is
the domain of Lower Languedoc, the angle CDB of 60 degrees is the part
of the domain that represents its taille. Half a circle EFG is the domain of
Upper Languedoc, the angle FHG of 30 degrees is the part of the domain
which represents its taille. Two half circles are equal, as easy to see in the
ýgure: how do I make their sizes equal? I have to take 15 degrees off the
60-degree angle and add them to the 30-degree angle, which will give
45 degrees for the domain of Upper Languedoc”.63
Figure 4. Fiscal Reform: a mathematical question!
Source. A.N., H-944-1.
The most signiýcant element to emphasize is the fact that mathematics
functioned as a third political language during a period of ýnancial
enquiry, as though Muret were a new Galileo arguing that mathematics was
the language of policy just as it had been the language of nature in the
seventeenth century. When, in 1789, the estates of Languedoc published
their Compte rendu, they also used the language of mathematics, albeit in
a simpler way, by separating their accounts into deniers royaux and deniers
provinciaux, which was a way, according to Arlette Jouanna, “neutralize
62. AN, H-944.1, fol. 193-204,Mémoire à nos seigneurs des Trois Etats de la province
de Languedoc (1776).
63. Ibidem.
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criticisms” because the provincial expenses were so much lower than those
expenses engaged on behalf of the king.64
The invention of ýnancial tables therefore occurred in the context
of this broader evolution that involved the quest for accurate information
in order to improve the provincial common good through transparency
in matters of administration. We have argued that this science of estates
began in the 1730s in Brittany, and later in Burgundy in the 1770s. Further
investigations would be necessary to demonstrate conclusively that
Languedoc experienced the same changes, but the case of Muret strongly
suggests that same process was in action. It is also worth pointing out that
Necker, in his Traité de l’administration des þnances de la France, spoke
in favour of developing tools to assist decision-making and to promote
transparency. Chapter 28 recalls the proposal he had prepared for the king
concerning the institution of “a separate board, designed solely to collect a
multiplicity of interesting information, and to classify it in a clear and easy
way. No such collection exists at present; each new minister, according to
his abilities or to the degree of concern he takes in public affairs, requires
some information here and there; and while he considers these explanations
as only gratifying his own curiosity, he carries them away with him on
his resignation, and very often burns them as useless”.65 In this matter, the
provincial estates were clearly ahead of the central state itself.
“There is a beautiful painting to bemade of the destruction of the realm
by a blind administration.”66 This remark made by François Quesnay to his
disciple, the Marquis of Mirabeau, in 1757, could almost have been written
by the provincial estates themselves. In Brittany, the very ýrst acts in favour
of a dissipation of the political secrecy happened in the 1730s, although
the most signiýcant documents arguing for transparency were written there
between 1760 and 1789, the period when the estates of Languedoc and
Burgundy also debated and discussed the same issues.
The quest for administrative and ýnancial transparency attests to the
will and the determination of these institutions to improve their policies
64. A. JOUANNA, 2014, p.601
65. J. NECKER, 1787, 3 vol., t. 3, p. 359-360. “Un bureau particulier destiné uniquement
à recueillir une multitude de connaissances intéressantes et à ranger ces connaissances dans
un ordre clair et facile. Cette collection n’existe point ; chaque nouveau ministre selon le
degré de son intérêt ou de son aptitude aux affaires publiques demande ça et là quelques
éclaircissements ; et considérant ces renseignements comme relatifs à sa curiosité, il les
ensevelit avec lui dans sa retraite” in J. NECKER, 1785, p. 850.
66. AN, manuscrits Mirabeau, MS 778, fol. 18.
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by producing knowledge in order to assist and improve decision-making.
The main subjects that they discussed involved ýnancial questions — taxes
and loans – as there were the basic conditions of a process whereby they
were redeýning their role and place within the monarchy in general, and the
province in particular. But discussion was not limited to ýnancial matters: the
science of the estates relied on a broader appetite for analytical knowledge
which was the hallmark of the eighteenth century. We must understand the
economic rationale of Lavoisier in Freschines as similar to the attempts made
by the provincial estates to construct an administrative science.67
Orders and decisions from both the general assembly and the various
executive commissions need to be understood as resulting from the quest
for informed consent. Their attention to the common good represents
an ambition for the future, a goal to achieve through an improvement in
knowledge. That they partly succeeded in this task is demonstrated by the
ease with which a transition was made between the provincial debt and
the national public debt.68 Their tools, however, were not as sophisticated
as those perfected by William Playfair in 1786 in his Commercial and
Political Atlas which depicted the economic landscape of England and
Wales in no fewer than forty-four graphs describing imports and exports
with their trading partners.69 The balance of trade was thus represented in
terms of visual experience as provincial public debt could have been in the
French pays d’États.
François Quesnay was right to call Mirabeau’s attention to the shift
which had occurred in the nature of provincial estates.70 By the mid-
eighteenth century, they were no longer corps entrenched in the defense of
their privilèges, ýercely bargaining with the royal power about the ýscal
amount they would have to pay. At the same time it is not accurate or
helpful to portray them as blindly obedient to royal will. They were anxious
to monitor their own resources, which was clearly not what Louis XIV
demanded.71Under Louis XV, and even more under Louis XVI, they became
67. J. SWANN, 2003; S. DURAND et alii, 2014.
68. J. LOISEAU, 2014.
69. H.WAINER, p. 5, 2005. The author would like to thank J.-F. Dunyach for the seminal
lecture he gave on William Playfair, in 2014, to the seminary held by the Laboratoire des
Sciences Historiques of the Université de Franche-Comté.
70. AN, manuscrits Mirabeau, MS 778, fol. 15 and M.-L. LEGAY, 2001, p. 321.
71. J. SWANN, 2003, p. 163: “The don gratuit was transformed into a carefully staged-
managed ritual of ‘spontaneous’ and ‘joyful’ obedience to the king.” “Les estats n’examinent
pas si la somme qu’ils donnent est proportionnée aux forces de la province ou au tarif qui
servait autrefois pour les répartitions qui se faisaient sur le général du royaume, ils ferment
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commissioners of the king72 as well as territorial administrators with
responsibilities for roads, canals, public instruction, agriculture and other
matters, and they were motivated by a clear desire to know and to measure.73
In the process, they sought to acquire, virtually unaided, the kind of political
skills that have become components of modern parliaments in terms of the
control of ýnances, publicity of debates and publication of their decisions.
The provincial estates sought to play a political role and were thus
criticised, a fact which is clearly highlighted in the cahiers de doléances of
the third estates in Burgundy or in the généralité of Moulins in 1789. Most
of these grievances were in favour of the preservation of the estates but
strongly denounced their lack of representativeness. Burgundians, Bretons
or Languedocians argued that représentation without paying taxes was
unacceptable, a claim, very close to the rallying cry during the American
Revolution, explaining why provincial estates had been abolished by the
National Assembly in december 1789.
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Appendexe 1. New statement of taxes in 1778, available funds are underlined
Source. Archives nationales, H.139, fol.98
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Appendexe 2. An other statement of taxes in 1783
Source. Archives nationales, H.139, fol.114
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Appendexe 5. Statement of debts
Source. A.D.IV., 1782, C-3846
Appendexe 6. Statement of loans on the behalf of the king
Source. A.D.IV., 1782, C-3846
